Consider a firm that owns a fixed capacity of a resource that is consumed in the production or delivery of multiple products. The firm's problem is to maximize its total expected revenues over a finite horizon either by choosing a dynamic pricing strategy for each product, or, if prices are fixed, by selecting a dynamic rule that controls the allocation of capacity to requests for the different products. This paper shows how these well-studied revenue management problems can be reduced to a common formulation where the firm controls the aggregate rate at which all products jointly consume resource capacity. Product-level controls are then chosen to maximize the instantaneous revenues subject to the constraint that they jointly consume capacity at the desired rate. This highlights the common structure of these two problems, and in some cases leads to algorithmic simplifications through the reduction in the control dimension of the associated optimization problems. In addition, we show that this reduction leads to a closed-form solutions of the associated deterministic (fluid) formulation of these problems, which, in turn, suggest several natural static and dynamic pricing heuristics that we analyze asymptotically and through an extensive numerical study. In the context of the former, we show that "resolving" the fluid heuristic achieves asymptotically optimal performance under fluid scaling.
Introduction
Consider a firm that owns a fixed capacity of a certain resource that is consumed in the process of producing or offering multiple products or services, and which must be consumed over a finite time horizon. The firm's problem is to maximize its total expected revenues by selecting the appropriate dynamic controls. We will consider two well studied problem formulations. In the first, the firm is assumed to be a monopolist or to operate in a market with imperfect competition, and thus to have power to influence the demand for each product by varying its price. In this setting, the firm's problem is to choose a dynamic pricing strategy for each of its products in order to optimize expected revenues. In the second situation, prices are assumed to be fixed either by the competition or through a higher-order optimization problem, and the firm's problem is now to choose a dynamic capacity allocation rule that controls when to accept new requests for each of these products. In the sequel, these two problems will be referred to as the "dynamic pricing" and "capacity control" formulations, respectively. Revenue management problems of that sort originated in the late 1970's in the context of the airline industry, and have since been successfully introduced in a variety of other areas such as hotels, cruise lines, rental cars, retail etc. For example, the first of these problems may arise in the retail industry, while the second one tends to be associated with the airline industry (although there are examples of airlines that practice revenue management through a dynamic pricing policy as well).
Both of these problems have been studied quite extensively in the revenue management literature, in each case highlighting the structure of the optimal controls, proposing near-optimal heuristics, and evaluating their performance in extensive numerical studies for both stylized examples as well as real-life applications. This paper illustrates how these two problems can be reduced to a common formulation and thus be treated in a unified manner, and explores some of the consequences of this formulation. Broadly speaking this is done as follows: Consider a firm that owns capacity of a single resource and offers multiple products, and suppose for now that the aggregate rate at which capacity is consumed is given. One can then compute the vector of product prices or capacity controls in each case in order to maximize the instantaneous expected revenue subject to the constraint that the aggregate capacity consumption equals the aforementioned rate. This is akin to the basic microeconomics problem of resource allocation subject to a budget constraint. Its solution, which in some cases can be obtained in closed form, defines an aggregate expected revenue rate as a function of the capacity consumption rate, and identifies the optimal way of translating the latter into a vector of product-level controls. One can now reformulate both the "dynamic pricing" and the "capacity control" problems as "single resource, single product" pricing problems, where the firm controls the instantaneous resource consumption rate and where revenues are accrued according to appropriate aggregate revenue function. Pricing and capacity decisions are then extracted from the optimal capacity consumption rate in the manner described above.
This formulation constitutes the main modelling contribution of the paper, which then proceeds to explore some of its theoretical and practical implications in dynamic pricing and capacity control revenue management problems. Specifically, we show that the multi-product dynamic pricing problem introduced by Gallego and van Ryzin [9] and the capacity control problem of Lee and Hersh [16] can be recast within this common framework, and be treated as different instances of a single-product pricing problem for appropriate concave revenue functions (Propositions 1 and 2). This highlights the common structure of the pricing and capacity control problems and allows us to treat both in a unified framework. This, of course, recovers well-known structural results regarding the monotonicity properties of the value function and the associated controls (see Propositions 3 and Corollary 2) that were previously derived in the literature while studying each of these problems in isolation, see, e.g., [8, 9, 16, 15, 24] and the recent book by Talluri and van Ryzin [22] . Moreover, Corollary 1 establishes that the optimal multi-product pricing policy has a certain monotone and nested structure. Although our analysis is done in a stationary setting, most of our results extend to allow for non-stationary demand models, in which case the associated dynamic pricing single-product problems are of the form studied by Zhao and Zheng [24] .
A similar type of demand aggregation appeared in Talluri and van Ryzin [21] while analyzing a capacity control problem for a system where customer behavior is captured through a discrete choice model. Demand aggregation techniques have been exploited in the past in the numerical solution of the dynamic programs associated with these revenue management problems. Finally, similar ideas of demand aggregation arise in the context of "equivalent workload formulations" in stochastic network theory; see Harrison and van Mieghem [12] for background, and Maglaras [19] for a recent application of this idea in the context of a joint pricing and scheduling problem.
This new formulation leads to several qualitative and quantitative insights. The first concerns the derivation of simple pricing and capacity control heuristics. Specifically, both multi-product formulations are reduced into dynamic pricing problems for single-product models of the type studied by Gallego and van Ryzin [8] . Based on their analysis this implies that a static pricing heuristic is optimal for the deterministic and continuous (fluid) approximation of the underlying problems, and asymptotically optimal in an appropriate sense for the original problems. This was already observed by Gallego and van Ryzin [9] , but their characterization of that policy in the multiproduct setting was implicit. Our reduction of the multi-product problem to an appropriate singleproduct one leads to a closed-form characterization of that fixed-price heuristic (see Proposition 4); see also the review article by Bitran and Caldentey [1] for a discussion of deterministic multi-product pricing problems. In contrast to the dynamic programming analysis discussed above, the fluid formulation of these problems allows us to consider a more general class of models where products may differ with respect to their capacity requirements. Based on the solution of the fluid formulation we propose three heuristics: (i) a static pricing heuristic; (ii) a static pricing heuristic applied in conjunction with an appropriate capacity allocation policy; and (iii) a "resolving" heuristic that re-evaluates the fluid policy as a function of the current state and time-to-go (which is derived by expressing the fluid solution in feedback form).
The first of these heuristics was suggested by Gallego and van Ryzin [9] . Once prices are fixed, the firm's problem has been reduced to one of capacity control, of the type analyzed in Lee and Hersh [16] , which motivates the second heuristic. Policies that combine static prices with capacity controls as in (ii) have been suggested in other papers such as McGill and van Ryzin [20] , Feng and Xiao [7] , and Lin et. al. [17] . Finally, the "resolving" heuristic (iii) is widely applied in practice, but to the best of our knowledge has not been analyzed theoretically thus far. The only exception was the negative result of Cooper [3] that illustrated through an example that resolving may in fact do worse than applying the static fluid policy. Section 4.2 establishes that all three heuristics achieve asymptotically optimal performance under fluid scaling, i.e., in the spirit of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] and Cooper [3] (Propositions 5 to 7). These results show that the phenomenon demonstrated in Cooper's example does not persist in problems with large capacity and demand, where in fact resolving achieves the asymptotically optimal performance. Moreover, the numerical results of Section 5 illustrate that the dynamic heuristics (ii) and (iii) tend to improve the firm's performance.
The second insight is structural and offers a partial characterization of good pricing and capacity allocation policies. The formulation advanced in this paper and specifically the subproblem of translating a capacity consumption rate into a set of product-level controls that jointly maximize instantaneous revenue, defines an efficient frontier for the firm's pricing and capacity control strategy. This captures in a tractable way the interactions between products due to cross-elasticity effects and the joint capacity constraint. The idea of an efficient frontier has also appeared in Talluri and van Ryzin [21] in the context of a capacity control problem for a model with customer choice among products, and in Feng and Xiao [6, 7] while studying pricing problems with a predetermined set of price points; the latter set of papers uses the term maximum increasing concave envelope.
While the main emphasis of this paper is not computational, it is worth noting that the control dimension reduction presented in this paper may lead to computational simplifications in cases where the subproblem of inferring the optimal demand rates given an aggregate consumption rate is solvable in closed-form. While this is not generally true, it does admit a simple solution in cases such as the linear demand model and the multinomial logit model (both are reviewed in Section 5), and it also leads to a simple characterization of the revenue function in the capacity control formulation. Moreover, it leads to algorithmic and computational simplifications in the case where there is a fixed set of price points for each product, as in the model studied in [7] .
Finally, we extend this formulation to the network case. The same decomposition in (a) choosing the aggregate resource consumption rates and then (b) translating these decisions to a vector of product prices still holds. As expected, the complexity of each of these steps increases in the network setting. However, the structural insights gleaned by this problem formulation provide a promising direction to follow in developing efficient network controls.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. This section concludes with some additional comments on the related literature. Section 2 describes the model and the associated problem formulations. Section 3 demonstrates the reduction of the dynamic programming formulations to that of a single-product pricing problem, and derives some of its structural properties. Section 4 discusses several insights and extensions that hinge on the previous results, and Section 5 provides some numerical illustration of our results and offers some concluding remarks.
The papers by Elmghraby and Keskinocak [5] , Bitran and Caldentey [1] , and McGill and van Ryzin [20] , and the book by Talluri and van Ryzin [22] provide comprehensive overviews of the areas of dynamic pricing and revenue management. The modelling framework adopted in this paper closely matches that of Gallego and van Ryzin [8, 9] , and, as in their work, we also partly focus on deterministic and continuous-dynamics (fluid) approximations of the underlying discrete problems to derive simple heuristics for the multi-product revenue management problems. See also Kleywegt [14] for a fluid model approach to multi-product network revenue management problem. Standard references on revenue management with capacity controls are Lee and Hersh [16] , Brumelle and McGill [2] and Lautenbacher and Stidhman [15] .
Single Resource, Multi-Product Model
This section poses the multi-product dynamic pricing and capacity control problems. We start with the former, which follows the model of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] , and then provide the necessary changes to formulate the latter, which is the model analyzed by Lee and Hersh [16] .
Dynamic pricing model
Consider a firm that is endowed with C units of capacity of a single resource that is used in producing or offering multiple products or services, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. Each unit of product i consumes one unit of capacity, and for simplicity we assume that C is integer valued. There is a finite horizon T over which the resources must be used, and capacity cannot be replenished up to that time. The firm is either a monopolist or is assumed to operate in a market with imperfect competition, and, in that, has power to influence the demand for each product by varying its menu of prices. Let p(t) = [p 1 (t), . . . , p n (t)] denote the vector of prices at time t. The demand process is assumed to be n-dimensional non-homogeneous Poisson process with rate vector λ determined through a demand function λ(p(t)), where λ : P → L, P ⊆ R n is the set of feasible price vectors, and L = {x ≥ 0 : x = λ(p), p ∈ P} ⊆ R n + is the set of achievable demand rate vectors. We assume that L is a convex set. A simple interpretation of the demand model in the single product case is as follows: if the total arrival rate of potential customers is Λ, and each customer has an independent identically distributed (IID) reservation price (i.e., maximum price they are willing to pay) for the product drawn from some distribution F , then customers that have reservation prices ≥ p choose to buy the product and λ(p) = Λ(1 − F (p)). Following [8, 9] we consider regular demand functions that satisfy the following requirements. In the sequel, x ′ will denote the transpose of any vector or matrix x (the use of T is reserved for the time horizon), and for any real number y, y + := max(0, y).
Assumption 1 A demand function is said to be regular if it is a continuously differentiable, bounded function, and: (a) for each product i, λ i (p) is strictly decreasing in p i , (b) lim p i →∞ λ i (p) = 0 (i.e., consumers have bounded wealth), and (c) the revenue rate
is bounded for all p ∈ P and has a finite maximizerp.
Note that this class of demand functions incorporate product complementarity and substitutions effects. For ease of exposition, we assume that the demand function is stationary. The extension to a non-stationary demand model can be done along the lines of Gallego and van Ryzin [8, 9] and Zhao and Zheng [24] . Also, this demand model assumes that customer decisions only depend on the current price vector and not on past and/or future pricing decisions. A more general model would allow customers to learn the firm's pricing policy and adjust their actions accordingly, and thus incorporate the strategic interaction between the firm and the customers' collective behavior. While this may seem appealing, it leads to a complicated game-theoretic analysis, and is often avoided both in the revenue management literature and in practice. See Vulcano et. al. [23, § 4.3] for a discussion of this issue with appropriate pointers to the literature.
We assume that there exists a continuous inverse demand function p(λ), p : L → P, that maps an achievable vector of demand rates λ into a corresponding vector of prices p(λ). This allows us to view the demand rate vector as the firm's control, and once this is selected infer the appropriate prices using the inverse demand function. The expected revenue rate as a function of the vector of demand rates, λ, is defined by R(λ) := λ ′ p(λ). In the sequel we will assume that the revenue rate functional R(·) is continuous, bounded and strictly concave.
Example: Under a linear demand model, the demand for product i is given by
where Λ i is the market potential for product i and b ii , b ij are the price and cross-price sensitivity parameters. This can be expressed in vector form as λ(p) = Λ − Bp, for the obvious choice of Λ, B. The inverse demand function is then given p(λ) = B −1 (Λ − λ), and the revenue function is given by R(λ) = λ ′ B −1 (Λ − λ). Assumption 1 requires that b ii > 0 for all i. To ensure that B −1 exists and the inverse demand function is well defined, and that the revenue function is concave we further require that either b ii > j =i |b ji | or b ii > j =i |b ij | for all i; both conditions guarantee that B is invertible and that its eigenvalues have positive real parts [13, Thm. 6.1.10] . If the products are substitutes (b ij ≤ 0 for all j = i), the first condition reduces to j b ji > 0, which implies that an increase in p i leads to a reduction in the total demand for all products. Alternatively, the second condition says that the effect of a marginal increase in p i on the demand for product i is bigger than that of a marginal increase on the prices of all other products.
The problem that we address is roughly described as follows: given an initial capacity C for that resource, a selling horizon T , and a demand function that maps the menu of prices into a set of demand rates for each product, the firm's goal is to choose a non-anticipating dynamic pricing strategy for each product in order to maximize its total expected revenues. The restriction to non-anticipating policies implies that the decisions at time t can only depend on the current state of the system as well as the time history up to time t, and not on future events.
We assume that the salvage value of remaining capacity at time T is zero. (Otherwise, at least in the case where the salvage value per unit of capacity at time T is constant, one could modify the objective function to be total expected revenue in excess of the salvage values.) We will adopt a discrete-time formulation, which assumes that time has been discretized in small intervals of length δt, indexed by t = 1, . . . , T , such that P(product i arrival in [0, δt]) = λ i δt + o(δt) for all products i, and P(product i and j arrivals in [0, δt]) = λ i λ j (δt) 2 +o((δt) 2 ), where o(x) implies that o(x)/x → 0 as x → 0. With slight abuse of notation, in the sequel we will write λ i in place of λ i δt; i.e., λ i will not refer to the rate of the underlying Poisson arrival process, but to the probability that a product i request occurs in each time interval. We will refer to λ i as the demand or the buying probability for product i, interchangeably. Hence, the corresponding demand random vector for period t, denoted by ξ(t; λ), is Bernoulli with probabilities λ that are controlled by the vector of posted prices, and P(ξ i (t) = 1) = λ i (p(t)) and P(ξ i (t) = 0) = 1 − λ i (p(t)) for all products i. As stated above, we will treat the demand rates λ i as the control variables and infer the appropriate prices through the inverse demand relationship. The discrete-time formulation of the dynamic pricing problem of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] is as follows:
where e is the vector of ones of appropriate dimension and "a.s." stands for almost surely.
The Single-Resource Capacity Control Problem
The second problem that we will consider is the one studied by Lee and Hersh [16] that takes the product prices as exogenously fixed and strives to optimize over the capacity allocation decisions. In more detail, the price vector p is fixed a priori, and this also fixes the corresponding vector of demand rates λ = λ(p). In the context of this problem and without any loss of generality we will assume that the products are labelled in such a way that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ · · · ≥ p n . The firm has discretion as to which product requests to accept at any given time. This is modelled through the control u i (t) for each product i, which is equal to the probability of accepting such a request at time t. It is customary to assume that the firm is "opening" or "closing" products (or fare classes), thus leading to controls u i (·) that take the values of 0 or 1, but this need not be imposed as a restriction. A more general class of controls could allow the firm to flip a coin upon arrival of a product i request with probability of success given by u i (t) and make the accept/rejection decision accordingly. The dynamic capacity control problem can be formulated as follows:
where uλ above denoted the vector with coordinates u i λ i .
Analysis of the pricing and capacity control problems
This section describes how to reduce (1) and (2) into dynamic optimization problems where the control is the (one-dimensional) aggregate capacity consumption rate. Subsequently, we derive some structural properties for these two problems through a unified analysis.
Dynamic programming formulation of the pricing problem
Consider the dynamic pricing problem posed in (1) . Let x denote the number of remaining units of capacity at the beginning of period t, and V (x, t) be the expected revenue-to-go starting at time t with x units of capacity left. Then, the Bellman equation associated with (1) is:
with the boundary conditions
Letting ∆V (x, t) = V (x, t + 1) − V (x − 1, t + 1) denote the marginal value of one unit of capacity as a function of the state (x, t), (3) can be rewritten as
The gist of the proposed solution approach is to rewrite (5) in terms of the one-dimensional aggregate rate of capacity consumption defined by ρ := n i=1 λ i . We first consider the maximum achievable revenue rate subject to the constraint that all products jointly consume capacity at a rate ρ, which is given by the solution to the following parametric optimization problem
Note that (6) is concave maximization problem over a convex set, and its solution is readily computable, often in closed form (examples are given in Section 5). Moreover, R r (·) is a concave function and satisfies the conditions of Assumption 1, and R r (ρ)/ρ is the optimal "average" price per unit of capacity, which is interpreted as an inverse demand function for this aggregate model. The unique vector of demand rates that achieves that optimum will be denoted by λ r (ρ). Let R := {ρ : n i=1 λ i = ρ, λ ∈ L} be the set of achievable capacity consumption rates. Then:
The dynamic pricing problem (1) can be reduced to the dynamic program
and the boundary condition (4) expressed in terms of the one-dimensional aggregate consumption rate. In particular, if ρ * (x, t) denotes the optimal solution of (7) and (4) and λ * (x, t) and p * (x, t) denote the optimal demand rate and price vectors associated with (1), then,
Next, we show how the capacity control formulation can also be reduced to a problem that resembles (7), and then proceed to analyze the structure of both problems in an unified manner.
DP formulation of the capacity control problem
Using the notation established above, the Bellman equation associated with (2) is
with the boundary condition (4), which using the marginal value of capacity ∆V becomes
Suppose products are labelled such that
to be the maximum instantaneous revenue rate when the aggregate capacity consumption rate (or probability of a sale at that time) is given by ρ. Let u a (ρ) be the control that attains that maximum. Using the structure of the knapsack problem that defines R a (·) we get that
where c 1 = 0 and c i = k<i λ k (p k − p i ), and for any x ∈ R, x + := max(x, 0). That is, the optimal solution starts from offering product 1 (with the highest price) and keeps adding more products until the total probability of a sale in period t becomes equal to ρ. In practice, of course, one would always set u a 1 (ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ 0, i.e., it is never optimal to close the highest-fare class. The "average" expected selling price is R a (ρ)/ρ = min i c i /ρ + p i , which is, of course, decreasing in ρ, and R a (·) is concave. Combining these results, (2) can be expressed as a dynamic problem in terms of ρ as follows:
subject to the boundary condition (4) . This structural result is summarized below.
Proposition 2 The capacity control problem (2) can be reduced to the dynamic program (11) and (4) expressed in terms of the one-dimensional aggregate consumption rate ρ. In particular, if ρ * (x, t) denotes the optimal solution of (11) and (4) and u * (x, t) denote the optimal policy for (2), then
This last result was also derived in Talluri and van Ryzin [21] , while considering the capacity control problem for a model with customer choice. While their model and emphasis was different than ours, one of their key findings was also that the optimal policy in multi-product settings can be expressed in terms of the aggregate probability of a sale and the associated expected revenue, i.e., ρ and R a (ρ).
A unified analysis of the pricing and capacity control problems
The similarity of the dynamic programs for the pricing and capacity control problems highlights their common structure and allows them to be treated in a unified manner. For both (7) and (11) the optimal control ρ * (x, t) is computed from
where R(·) is any concave increasing revenue function. Using the properties of R(·) one gets that ρ * (x, t) is decreasing in ∆V (x, t), which using a backwards induction argument in t gives that ∆V (x, t) is decreasing in x and t. These standard results for single-product dynamic pricing problems are summarized below; a proof can be found in [22 (1) and (2) we have that:
1. ρ * (x, t) is decreasing in the marginal value of capacity ∆V (x, t), and 2. ∆V (x, t) is decreasing in x and t.
Next, we specialize these results to the dynamic pricing and capacity allocation problems. We first consider the dynamic pricing problem and for illustrative purposes focus on the case where the products are non-substitutes. That is, the demand for product i is only a function of the price for that product p i . In that case, the Lagrangian associated with (6) is given by L(λ, x, y) = R(λ) + x(ρ − n i=1 λ i ) − y ′ λ, and the associated first order conditions are given by ∂R(λ)/∂λ i = x + y i , for some x ≥ 0 and y i ≤ 0 with y i = 0 if λ i > 0. It is easy to show that x is decreasing in ρ (i.e., the shadow price for the capacity consumption constraint decreases as the associated rate ρ increases), and that λ r i (ρ) is decreasing in x. This is summarized below.
Corollary 1 Consider the problem specified in (3) and (4) and further assume that the products are non-substitutes, i.e., λ i (p) = λ i (p i ) for all i. λ * i (x, t) is non-decreasing in ρ * (x, t) (and nonincreasing in ∆V (x, t)).
A similar result can be obtained when products are substitutable provided that the demand model satisfies certain conditions analogous to the ones given for the price sensitivity matrix B in §2.1 when describing the linear demand model example.
Finally, we specialize these results to the capacity control problem to recover some well known structural properties of the optimal policy, see, e.g., Lee and Hersh [16] . Our derivation based on the aggregate control offers some new intuition as to why they hold. To start with, the optimal control ρ * (x, t) is the solution to the following optimization problem
Let i * (x, t) = max{i ≥ 1 : p i ≥ ∆V (x, t)}. Then, by inspecting the form of the piecewise linear objective function involved in the calculation of ρ * (x, t) we get that
That is, the solution is "bang-bang" in the sense that the form of the optimal control is such that u * i (x, t) is 0 if i > i * (x, t) and 1 if i ≤ i * (x, t). In addition, from Proposition 3 part 1 we see that i * (x, t) is decreasing in the marginal value of capacity ∆V (x, t). Therefore:
Corollary 2 For the capacity control problem (2) or equivalently, (11) and (4), the optimal allocation policy is nested in that u * i (x, t) = 1 if i ≤ i * (x, t), and u * i (x, t) = 0 otherwise, and i * (x, t) is decreasing in the marginal value of capacity ∆V (x, t).
An efficient frontier for multi-product pricing and capacity controls
The subproblem of computing the optimal revenue subject to a constraint on the aggregate capacity consumption rate specified in (6) and (10) defines an efficient frontier (ρ, R r (ρ)) and (ρ, R a (ρ)) for the dynamic pricing and capacity allocation problems, respectively. As in the context of portfolio optimization, the efficient frontier provides a systematic framework for comparing different policies and highlights the structure of the optimal controls for these two problems. It may also lead to computational improvements if this subproblem can be solved efficiently, preferably in closed form. This can be achieved for some commonly used demand models such as the linear and the multinomial logit; both are reviewed in section 5.
As mentioned in the introduction the idea of an efficient frontier has also appeared in Feng and Xiao [6, 7] and Talluri and van Ryzin [21] . The structure of the dynamic programs studied in this section has been observed in other revenue management papers, such as Lin et. al. [17] and their study of single-resource capacity control problems where each arrival may request multiple units of capacity, and Vulcano et. al. [23] and their analysis of optimal dynamic auctions. The second of these papers studies a discrete time model where demand arrives in batches, and in each period the firm runs an auction among the potential buyers of that period. Given an announced auction mechanism, the firm observes the bids and selects how many units to award by balancing total consumption with the extracted revenues in that period. This is the discrete-time, batch demand analog to choosing ρ and computing R r (ρ), and in that sense the dynamic programming structure in [23] is closely related to the one observed here.
Deterministic analysis of the multi-product pricing problem
This section studies deterministic (fluid model) formulations of multi-product revenue management problems to provide some structural results (Section 4.1) and suggest simple and implementable heuristics for the underlying problems (Section 4.2). The latter have desirable theoretical performance guarantees and are shown to perform well in the numerical experiments of the next section. Finally, section 4.3 sketches how to extend these ideas to the network setting.
Solution to the deterministic multi-product pricing problem
The dynamic program of section 3.1 is generally not solvable in closed form, and one has to refer to numerical techniques for the computation of the optimal pricing decisions, which is often difficult and results in policies that are hard to implement. This motivates the use of approximate models that are analytically tractable and may lead to practical solutions. The most natural candidate is the "fluid" model that has deterministic and continuous dynamics, and is obtained by replacing the discrete stochastic demand process by its rate, which now evolves as continuous process. It is rigorously justified as a limit under a strong-law-large-numbers type of scaling when we let the potential demand and the capacity grow proportionally large; see Gallego and van Ryzin [8, 9] , and Section 4.2.
It is simplest to describe the fluid model in continuous time (this is consistent with Gallego and van Ryzin [8, 9] ). In more detail, the realized instantaneous demand for product i at time t in the fluid model is deterministic and given by λ i (t). and allow product i requests to consume capacity at a rate of a i > 0 units per unit of demand, and denote by a the vector [a 1 , . . . , a n ]. This is a generalization of the model considered thus far that assumed uniform capacity requirements that with no loss of generality can be taken to be 1, which however can be addressed with no increase in complexity. With a general capacity requirement vector a the capacity consumption rate is defined by ρ = a ′ λ, and the definitions of R r and λ r can be appropriately adjusted to reflect that change. The system dynamics are given by dx(t)/dt = − n i=1 a i λ i (t), x(0) = C, together with the boundary condition that x(T ) ≥ 0. i.e., this model has deterministic and continuous dynamics. The firm selects a demand rate λ i (t) (or a price) at each time t. The fluid control formulation of our revenue management problem is the following:
Single-product problem: For the case with one product Gallego and van Ryzin [8] showed that a fixed price (and thus a constant demand rate) is optimal for (12). This is described as follows. Letλ = argmax{R(λ) : λ ∈ L} andp = p(λ) be the demand rate and price that maximize the instantaneous revenue rate in the absence of any capacity considerations, respectively. Also, define λ 0 = C/T be the run-out rate that depletes capacity at time T , and let p 0 = p(λ 0 ) be the associated price. Then, Gallego and van Ryzin [8] showed that
are the optimal demand rate and price for the fluid formulation of the pricing problem given in (12) . (To differentiate from the solution of the dynamic programming formulation of the previous section we have used an overbar to denote the fluid solution.) That is, the optimal demand and price are constant and do not depend on the state of the system at any given time t. Intuitively, the solution uses the revenue maximizing pricep unless this will deplete the capacity too soon, in which case the firm can increase its unit price to p 0 and sell its capacity by time T , while accruing higher total revenues. Gallego and van Ryzin [9, §4.5] extended these results to multiple products, but in that case without providing such a succinct solution.
Multi-product problem: Following the approach of section 3 we can reduce the multi-product problem to an appropriate single-product one, and thus solve it in closed form. Specifically, recalling the definitions of the aggregate revenue function R r (ρ) and optimal demand rate vector λ r (ρ) in (6) adjusted for the fact that ρ = a ′ λ, (12) can be rewritten as:
Note that (13) is the same as (12) for a single product with the revenue function R r , and hence, it is solvable using the approach described above. Let ρ 0 := C/T andρ = argmax ρ R r (ρ). Then, the optimal solution to (13) is to consume capacity at a constant rateρ given bȳ
The corresponding vector of demand rates that maximizes the instantaneous revenues subject to the constraint that capacity is consumed at a rateρ is given by λ r (ρ), and the corresponding prices are p(λ r (ρ)). A direct verification that this solution satisfies the optimality conditions for (12) establishes the following result.
Proposition 4 Letλ(·) andp(·) denote the optimal vectors of demand rates and prices for (12) . Then,λ,p are constant over time and are given bȳ
Heuristic policies extracted from the deterministic analysis
Based on the preceding analysis we propose three heuristics for the underlying revenue management problems, which we analyze in the asymptotic setting introduced in Gallego and van Ryzin [9] and Cooper [3] . Among other things we will show that the dynamic heuristic that "resolves" the fluid policy as t progresses is asymptotically optimal in an appropriate sense.
I. Pricing heuristics a. A static pricing heuristic:
The first and simplest of our heuristics implements a static pricing policyp specified in Proposition 4. This policy corresponds to the make-to-order heuristic of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] .
The static nature of policy (a) is desirable for implementation purposes (see Gallego and van Ryzin [9] ), but also removes any form of capacity control. This issue does not arise in the fluid formulation, because capacity is then drained along an optimal deterministic trajectory, but it may be relevant in the underlying stochastic problem when capacity is close to being depleted. The next heuristics provide two possible adjustments to this static policy that add such capacity control capability and seem of practical interest. We start by recognizing that the solution of the fluid pricing problem of Section 4.1 can also be described in feedback form as
where x is the remaining capacity at time t. The deterministic trajectory of the fluid model is, of course, such that x/(T − t) = C/T for all t ifρ ≥ C/T , and x/(T − t) = (C −ρt)/(T − t) ≥ C/T if ρ < C/T . In both cases,ρ(x, t) = min(ρ, C/T ) for all x, t along the fluid trajectory of the capacity process, and thus (16) is identical to the static control derived in (14) .
b. A List Price Capacity Control (LPCC) heuristic:
One way to implement (16) is by coupling capacity control decisions together with the static pricing policy given in (a). Specifically, our second heuristic is defined as follows:
1. price according top and label products such thatp 1 /a 1 ≥p 2 /a 2 ≥ · · · ≥p n /a n , and 2. computeρ(x, t) and use the capacity controls u 1 (x, t) = 1 if x > 0, u 1 (0, t) = 0, and
Note that with prices fixed, this control can only reduce the aggregate capacity consumption rate over its nominal value of n i=1 a iλi , but can never increase it. This heuristic makes a product available only if the fluid solution starting from that state would choose to sell this product in all future time periods, and "closes" the product if the fluid solution would dictate only partial acceptance of the associated demand. When implementing in a discrete-time setting, rounding errors can be avoided by setting
This policy is a refinement of the static pricing policy in (a) and the make-to-order heuristic of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] . Other examples of joint pricing and capacity controls can be found in the recent papers by Vulcano et. al. [23] , by Lin et. al. [17] and Feng and Xiao [7] . c. A dynamic pricing heuristic: The third policy translates the aggregate controlρ(x, t) into product-level rates (and prices) through λ(x, t) = λ r (ρ(x, t)) and p(x, t) = p(λ(x, t)),
where the mapping λ r (·) was the maximizer in (6) . This corresponds to the idea of "resolving" the fluid problem as we step through time, which is widely applied in practice, where, however, the resolving occurs at discrete points in time, e.g., daily or weekly depending on the application setting. Despite its practical appeal and use, to the best of our knowledge policies that use this resolving idea have not been analyzed theoretically, other than the isolated example provided by Cooper [3] that illustrated that resolving may in fact degrade the performance of the fluid heuristic in a stochastic problem of multi-product capacity control problem. Our preceding discussion illustrates that "resolving" is nothing but implementing the fluid policy in feedback form. The analysis that follows will characterize its behavior in an appropriate asymptotic sense, and the numerical results of the next section will demonstrate that it tends to outperform the other two candidate policies.
II. Asymptotic performance analysis of the pricing heuristics
The remainder of this subsection offers a brief asymptotic characterization of the performance under these three heuristics that shows that all three are (fluid-scale) asymptotically optimal in a regime where the potential demand and capacity grow proportionally large; this is consistent with the setup and the criterion of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] and Cooper [3] . Specifically, using k as an index, we will consider a sequence of problems with demand model λ k (·) = kλ(·) and capacity C k = kC, and we will let k increase to infinity; a superscript k will denote quantities that scale with k. Let N i for i = 1, . . . , n denote independent unit rate Poisson processes, and recall the functional strong-law-of-large numbers for the Poisson process that asserts that as k → ∞ and for all t ≥ 0,
For all of the candidate policies the capacity dynamics can be expressed as follows. Let (20) where λ i (t) is the demand rate for product i at time t. Then, the cumulative demand for that product up to time t is equal to N i (A k i (t)) and the remaining capacity at time t is
Our goal here is to analyze the "fluid-scale" behavior of the capacity process defined asX k (t) := X k (t)/k under the three candidate policies. The analysis of the static policy (a) is related to that of Gallego and van Ryzin [9] , while those of the dynamic policies are new.
Analysis of the static heuristic (a):
In this case, the firm uses the constant price vectorp, which results in the demand rates λ k (p) = kλ. We could either assume that the demand rates become 0 when the capacity is depleted, or keep them unchanged but modify (21) 
The subscript is used to identify the policy.) For simplicity we will proceed with the latter. For this policy we have that A k i (t) =λ i kt, and thus as k → ∞
It immediately follows that as k → ∞ and for all t ∈ [0, T ]
the (·) + was removed since from (14) ρt ≤ C for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Let R k a denote the revenues extracted under policy (a), and τ k := inf{s ≥ 0 : n i=1 a i N i (λ i ks) ≥ C k } be the random time where the aggregate capacity requested reaches or exceeds the available capacity C k . Then,
where δ is a random variable that corrects revenues for the case where τ k < T , which is bounded above by max ipi . (We will not delve into an accurate description of δ, since it will turn out to be asymptotically negligible.) From (22) and arguing by contradiction shows that (T − τ k ) + → 0 a.s., as k → ∞. Combining with (23) we get the following result.
Proposition 5 Suppose that demand and capacity are scaled according to λ k (·) = kλ(·) and C k = kC, and consider the static pricing policy p k (x, t) =p for all x, t and all k. Then, as k → ∞, X k a (t) → C −ρt a.s., uniformly in t, and
That is, the static pricing policy (a) is asymptotically optimal in that it achieves as k → ∞ the revenue extracted in the fluid model; this is the criterion used in Gallego and van Ryzin [9] and Cooper [3] . This is also referred to as fluid-scale asymptotic optimality (see Maglaras [18] ) to highlight that it pertains to optimality with respect to the highest order revenue term. We will next analyze the dynamic pricing policy (c), and then return to deal with (b).
Analysis of the dynamic heuristic (c):
The dynamic nature of this policy requires a more detailed study. The cumulative demand for product i up to time t is equal to N i (A k i (t)), where
for λ r i (·) defined in (6), and X k c (t) denotes the remaining capacity at time t under policy (c), defined in (21) . Now,X k c (t) is bounded (X k (t) ∈ [0, C]) and therefore the sequence {X k c (t) : t ∈ [0, T ]} is tight [10, §3] , and therefore has a converging subsequence, say {k j }, such that along this subsequence,X k j c (t) →x c (t) a.s., uniformly in t; at this point limit trajectory may depend on the converging subsequence, but as we will see momentarily all possible limit solutions coincide. Given the continuity of λ r i (·) and using Lemma 2.4 of Dai and Williams [4] we get that as k → ∞
a.s., uniformly in t. Using (19) , (21) and (25) we get that as k → ∞
where the last equality follows from identifying that this is the unique solution to (26), and the convergence is almost sure, uniformly in t. Finally, the revenues extracted under policy (c) are
where p k (t) is the price vector that corresponds to λ r (min(ρ,X k c (t)/(T − t))), the demand rate vector at time t, and the integrals should be interpreted in the Riemann-Stieltjes sense. From (25) and (26) we have that λ r i (min(ρ,X k c (t)/(T − t))) →λ i a.s., uniformly in t. By the continuity of the inverse demand function we have that p k (t) →p a.s., uniformly in t, and therefore using again Lemma 2.4 of Dai and Williams [4] we get the result summarized below.
Proposition 6
Suppose that demand and capacity are scaled according to λ k (·) = kλ(·) and C k = kC, and consider the dynamic pricing heuristic defined through (24) (17) and can be expressed as follows:
Analysis of the LPCC heuristic (b): This policy is defined through
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Similarly to the analysis of policy (c), the family {X k b (t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is tight, and thus it has a converging subsequence {k j } on whichX
Writing downx b (t) and evaluating u i (t), reveals that in the limit model u i (t) = 1 for all products i. Arguments similar arguments to the ones used above gives the following result.
Proposition 7
Suppose that demand and capacity are scaled according to λ k (·) = kλ(·) and C k = kC, and consider the LPCC heuristic defined through (27) 
That is, resolving and using either the dynamic pricing or the LPCC heuristics is asymptotically optimal in the fluid sense, as was the static policy (a). We note that the last proposition is related in spirit to the one proved in Lin et.al. [17] for their proposed policy. Propositions 6 and 7 established that the suboptimal behavior of the resolving idea demonstrated by the example of Cooper [3] does not persist when one considers its performance in systems with large capacity and large demand. The same asymptotic performance would be obtained in a setting where the resolving occurs in discrete points in time, provided that this is done sufficiently frequently. If l k is the time between resolving epochs, then the type of analysis used in studying the asymptotic behavior of discretereview policies (see Harrison [11] and Maglaras [18] ) can be applied to establish that it suffices that l k ↓ 0. That is, the number of demand requests between resolving periods must be small compared to the capacity. A more refined analysis that involves a central-limit-theorem type of correction to R k a , R k b and R k c that is proportional to √ k would in fact show that policy (c) is better than (b), which is better than (a). These findings are illustrated numerically in the next section. Finally, we note that the feedback nature of the dynamic policies will make them more robust against model and/or parameter uncertainties, e.g., with respect to the functional form of the demand model or the size of the cross-price sensitivity parameters. While this issue is of significant practical and theoretical interest, its analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
Dynamic Pricing Network Revenue Management Problems
Suppose that the firm is operating a network of resources, indexed by j = 1, . . . , m, and that each product i request consumes A ij units of resource j capacity. Let A := [A ij ] denote the associated capacity consumption matrix, and assume that the initial capacity for each resource j is C j . Then, the fluid model formulation of the network dynamic pricing problem is:
As before, this problem can be expressed in terms of ρ which is defined by ρ := Aλ. Specifically, let
be the maximum achievable revenue rate when resource capacity is consumed at a rate ρ, and λ r (ρ) denote the corresponding vector of optimal demand rates. Then, (28) can be reduced to
Letρ denote the solution to (30). Then, λ r (ρ) will be the vector of optimal demand rates for (28). This reduction can be computationally beneficial, since as is often the case the number of products (e.g., the number of fare-class and origin-destination pairs) tends to be greater than the number of resources (e.g., number of flights in a hub-and-spoke network). One can similarly address network capacity control problems using the results of the previous subsection. Overall, this structural decomposition seems a promising direction for future work towards the development of practical network revenue management algorithms. We refer the reader to Gallego and van Ryzin [9] and Kleywegt [14] for fluid formulations to multi-product network revenue management problems.
Numerical examples
This section reports on a set of numerical examples that contrast the performance of the heuristics proposed in the previous section to that of the optimal policy obtained from the dynamic program.
We review a variety of settings that explore the effects of the joint capacity constraint and of cross-price sensitivities in multi-product revenue management.
The base model that we use has two products, each consuming one unit of capacity per request, and a linear demand relationship of the form λ(p) = Λ − Bp with Λ = [.3, .1] and T = 200 time periods. Towards the end of the section we will study examples with three products and nonuniform capacity requirements. The price set is defined as P = {p : Λ − Bp ≥ 0}. Recall that the inverse demand and revenue functions are given by p(λ) = B −1 (Λ − λ) and R(λ) = λ ′ B −1 (Λ − λ), respectively. The specific policies that we consider are the following:
• "Revmax" corresponds to the monopoly price vectorp that maximizes the aggregate instantaneous revenue rate disregarding the capacity constraints, computed as follows:
• "Fluid" implemented the price vectorp = p(λ r (ρ)) as defined in (14) and (15) .
For the linear demand model one can derive closed form expressions for the aggregate revenue function R r (ρ), the corresponding revenue maximizing demand vector λ r (ρ), and get a simple characterization of policies (a) and (b). We will illustrate this point for the special case where B is diagonal, i.e., b ij = 0 for all i = j, in which case there are no cross-price sensitivity effects due to product substitution and/or complementarities. In this case, B = diag(b 11 , . . . , b II ) and
With no loss of generality we will assume that products are labelled such that
The "Revmax" policy is given bŷ
The "Fluid" policy is defined as follows. For a sequence of constants 0 = ρ (0) ≤ ρ (1) ≤ · · · ≤ ρ (I) (specified below) we setî(ρ) as a function of ρ to beî(ρ) = min{i ≥ 0 : ρ (i) ≥ ρ}, and then
, and R r (ρ) = λ r (ρ) ′ B −1 (Λ − λ r (ρ)) which is a piecewise concave quadratic function in ρ. The expression for µ comes from the form of the Lagrange multiplier that takes into account the "open" products. It remains to define the constants ρ (i) , which is done recursively as follows:
and so on. A similar argument can be applied when the cross-price sensitivity parameters are non-zero and the capacity requirements are not all equal to 1.
• "Decoupled-DP" is the following heuristic: each product manager calculated upfront a dynamic pricing strategy for his product by solving a single-item DP, disregarding cross-elasticity effects with the other product. At each point t in time, the remaining capacity is split according to the nominal split prescribed by the fluid solution,C i (t) := λ r (ρ) · (T − t). The product managers then implement the pricing strategy according to the remaining time and their assigned inventory. This heuristic is one of many possible "refinements" over the deterministic fluid solution, and is used for illustrative purposes.
• "LPCC" is the joint (list) pricing and capacity control heuristic defined through (17).
• "DynPrice" is the dynamic implementation of the fluid policy defined through (18).
• "DP" implemented the solution of the dynamic program outlined in Section 3.1.
The expected revenue under the first two static pricing rules were computed analytically using a binomial model, while those under the next three policies were obtained by averaging out revenues from 1,000 simulated sample paths.
I. The effect of the joint capacity constraint. Table 1 studies a series of problems with increasing capacity. The price sensitivity matrix is B = diag(1, 6), which implies that there are no crossprice sensitivity effects (b 12 = b 21 = 0) to isolate the effect of the joint capacity constraint on the performance of the various heuristics. 1 The resulting demand model was The "Fluid" pricing problem becomes unconstrained, i.e., the capacity constraint is not binding at its optimum, for C ≥ 40 units, in which cases the "Revmax" and "Fluid" prices coincide. We observe the following. First, the relative performance under the "Fluid" and "Revmax" heuristics improves as the capacity C increases; this is consistent with the results by Gallego and van Ryzin [8, 9] that also illustrated that the effect of the capacity constraint is more pronounced when C is scarce. Second, for the cases where the capacity is scarce, the "Fluid" heuristic that incorporates the capacity constraint significantly outperforms "Revmax," but its regret over the "DP" policy can still be substantial (0.7%-5.4%). Third, in comparing "Fluid" with "LPCC" we note that when the capacity is small C ≤ 20 the fluid prices effectively switch off product 2 and operates as a single-product system, where the two rules are almost identical. As the capacity increases, it is optimal to offer both products and the effect of the capacity control capability of LPCC becomes more evident. Switching from an effectively single-product to a two-product solution also causes the optimality gaps to be non-monotone. Fourth, the dynamic pricing heuristic that effectively resolves the fluid policy at each time point is significantly better than all these heuristics when the caapcity is scarce. Finally, the "Decoupled-DP" policy performs very poorly even when the firm has ample capacity, mainly because it disregards the pooling effects across products.
II. The cross-price elasticity effects. The next two tables study how cross-price sensitivity effects impact the performance of these heuristics by gradually increasing the interaction terms b 12 and b 21 . Table 2 used b 12 = −.4 and b 21 = −.6, which corresponds to the demand model λ 1 (p) = .3 − 1p 1 + .4p 2 and λ 2 (p) = .1 − 6p 2 + .6p 1 , while Table 3 had b 12 = −0.8 and b 21 = −1.2. Again, the "Decoupled-DP" heuristic performs very poorly when compared to all other candidates, and its performance deteriorates substantially as the magnitude of the cross-price interaction terms increases. The "Fluid" and "LPCC" policies that incorporate the interaction effects in their static prices perform consistently well, but again the magnitude of their respective optimality gaps tends to increase as the interaction coefficients increase. Based on a wide range of examples ran with random interaction terms b ij while keeping b ii constant, we found that the "LPCC" heuristic outperforms the "Fluid" policy by about .75% to 2% in cases where the capacity is sufficiently large so as to want to offer both products. The dynamic heuristic adds an other 1% of improvement. III. Mulitple products. Table 4 reports results for a model with three products, and provides a brief illustration of the consistently good performance of the LPCC and DynPrice policies. IV. Non-uniform capacity requirements The next two tables summarize results for a model with two products that have different capacity requirements. This change complicates the associated dynamic programming formulation, in the sense that the structural result of Section 3.1 that allows us to consider the problem in terms of the aggregate capacity consumption rate no longer holds. Numerically, this affects the backwards induction step required to solve the problem. In contrast, the fluid analysis of Section 4.1 and the heuristics extracted therein are still valid. In the notation of Section 4, we will assume that product i consumes a i units of capacity and a 1 = a 2 . The results of the next two tables suggest that the fluid model heuristics perform quite well in cases where the capacity requirements are small compared to the capacity itself. This effect is more pronounced in Table 6 because in this example the product that requires more capacity per request (product 1) happens to be the more profitable product as well, hence making the overall capacity small compared to a 1 in the first two or three rows. V. An analytical example: the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model We complete this section by illustrating that for the commonly used MNL choice model the subproblems of computing the revenue function and demand rates as functions of the aggregate demand rate are solvable in closed form. In the MNL model we assume that potential customers arrive to the firm with utilities for each product i given by u i +ξ i , where u i is the deterministic portion that is common to all customers and ξ i is the random term (that differentiates customers). The MNL choice model hinges on the assumption that these random terms ξ i are random variables drawn from a Gumbel distribution with mean zero and parameter one (the latter is assumed w.l.o.g.), which as IID across products and customers. The deterministic component of the utility can be written as u i = v i − p i , where v i denotes the "average value" of the product and p i is its price. Finally, we denote by u 0 + ξ 0 the utility of the no-purchase option, where ξ 0 is IID with the ξ i 's and w.l.o.g. we will assume that u 0 = 0. Finally, let Λ be the aggregate customer arrival rate or market size. Under these assumptions the demand rates for product i is given by λ i (p) = Λ e v i −p i 1 + j e v j −p j .
Suppose further that the cost of a unit of product i to the firm is given by c i > 0. Then, the profit rate function as a function of the price vector is given by 
This calculation offers a nice insight about the structure of the optimal pricing strategy, namely that each product is priced at its cost plus a common premium that depends on the aggregate capacity consumption rate. From a computational viewpoint, one can now use the expression for R r (ρ) in the dynamic program of the form discussed in §3.1 to efficiently solve for the optimal capacity consumption rate ρ * (x, t) and then use (32) to translate this into product-level controls.
